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CONFRONTATION RULES AFTER
DAVIS V. WASHINGTON
Roger W. Kirst*
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court began refining the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause doctrine it announced
two years earlier in Crawford v. Washington.1 In Crawford, the
Court held that the prosecution could not use a custodial
statement of an accomplice who was not cross-examined at the
time the statement was made, and could not be cross-examined
at trial.2 In his opinion for the Court in Crawford, Justice Scalia
described the core concern of the Confrontation Clause as the
use of “testimonial” statements by the prosecution.3 In a single
2006 opinion that decided both Davis v. Washington and
Hammon v. Indiana, the Court considered whether a statement
to the police in a 911 call or at a crime scene is testimonial.4
The Court affirmed the holding of the state court in Davis5 that
the prosecution could use certain statements of a domestic
violence victim to a 911 operator. The Court rejected the
*
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1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Id. at 68-69.
3
Id. at 51-52.
4
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
5
State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
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holding of the state court in Hammon6 that the prosecution could
use statements of a domestic violence victim to a responding
police officer at the crime scene.
The Court’s focus in Davis was how to distinguish between
statements to the police that can be used by the prosecution even
if the declarant cannot be cross-examined and statements to the
police that violate the Confrontation Clause if the declarant does
not appear at trial. Part I of this Article will discuss how
accurate and practical rules for 911 calls and statements at a
crime scene can be distilled from the language of Davis and the
Supreme Court’s disposition of several other petitions for
certiorari in light of Davis.
Judges, lawyers, and scholars will inevitably ask how much
guidance Davis might provide on confrontation questions the
Supreme Court did not address. Part II of this Article will
describe the cautions in Davis against extrapolating from its
specific holding to broader rules for other kinds of statements,
and will assess what Davis might add in the search for broader
confrontation doctrine.
Some questions about interpreting the Confrontation Clause
were answered in Davis, but the scope of the opinion must be
kept in proper perspective. Part III of this Article will describe
how a more recent case on the Court’s docket, New Mexico v.
Forbes,7 illustrates the convoluted history of the Supreme
Court’s ongoing search for stable confrontation doctrine.
I. STATEMENTS BY VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE
The resources for interpreting Davis include the Supreme
Court’s disposition of several other petitions for certiorari in light
of Davis, but the starting point must be the facts of the case and the
language of the opinion.

6
7

Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
2007 WL 632910 (U.S. 2007).
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A. Reading the Court’s Opinion
1. The Facts in Davis and Hammon
The first report of domestic violence in Davis was made in
a conversation between a 911 operator and a woman who
answered the telephone when the operator called back after a
call to 911 was terminated before anyone spoke.8 The woman
told the operator that “He’s here jumpin’ on me again.”9 She
gave the assailant’s name as Adrian Martell Davis.
Upon arriving at the scene, two responding police officers
observed that the caller was very upset, that she had fresh
injuries, and that she was frantically gathering her belongings
and children to leave the residence.10 The officers did not see
Davis at the scene. At the time, Davis was subject to a domestic
no-contact order. A charge of violating the order was elevated to
a felony by an allegation of an assault.11
At trial in Davis the two responding police officers testified
about what they observed at the crime scene, but they did not
see Davis at the scene, so they could not identify him as the
assailant.12 The woman who had called 911 did not appear as a
witness. In her place, the prosecution offered the tape recording
of the 911 telephone call, which the trial court held was an
excited utterance and admitted over the defendant’s confrontation
objection. The defendant’s conviction on the basis of the 911
recording was affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court after
it rejected the confrontation objection raised by Davis.13 That
court concluded that a victim’s emergency 911 call is not
testimonial if the apparent purpose is “a call for help to be
rescued from peril” and if it does not appear to be “generated
by a desire to bear witness.”14
8

See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270-71.
Id. at 2271.
10
See id.
11
See id.
12
See id.
13
See State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 851 (Wash. 2005).
14
Id. at 849.
9
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Hammon also involved a report of domestic violence.
However, the statement in Hammon came later in that incident
than the statement in the Davis incident because the prosecution
did not introduce the initial report that caused the dispatcher to
send officers to the location. Instead, the prosecution in
Hammon introduced accusations of assault that were made to the
officers at the scene by Amy Hammon, the woman who was
later named as the victim.
The scene the officers found in Hammon was similar in some
ways to the scene in Davis—they also found a frightened woman
and signs of recent violence.15 The scene was also different in
two important ways—Amy Hammon initially said nothing was
wrong instead of immediately making an accusation against the
assailant, and the alleged assailant was still present at the
scene.16 The statement by Amy that accused Hammon of being
the assailant was made while one officer talked to Amy as the
other officer remained with Hammon. Hammon was eventually
charged with domestic battery and a probation violation by
committing a battery.17
At trial in Hammon, the responding officer who had
interviewed Amy at the scene testified about Amy’s accusations,
but Amy did not appear. The trial court admitted Amy’s
statement as an excited utterance and convicted Hammon in a
bench trial. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected
Hammon’s confrontation objection.18 That court concluded that
Amy’s oral statement at the scene was not testimonial because it
was not “given or taken in significant part for purposes of
preserving it for potential future use in legal proceedings.”19 The
Indiana court described Amy’s statement as instead part of a
“preliminary investigation in which the officer was essentially
attempting to determine whether anything requiring police action
had occurred, and, if so, what . . . in the process of
15
16
17
18
19

See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272.
See id.
See id.
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
Id. at 456.
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accomplishing the preliminary tasks of securing and assessing
the scene.”20
2. Applying Davis to the Facts Before the Court
In his majority opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
described the issue as whether the interrogation produced a
testimonial statement governed by the rule in Crawford.21 He
first examined the facts of Davis. Justice Scalia described a
major distinction between Crawford and Davis as the fact that
Crawford had involved interrogation “solely directed at
establishing the facts of a past crime” while the initial
interrogation in a 911 call is “ordinarily . . . designed
primarily . . . to describe current circumstances requiring police
assistance.”22
In his discussion, Justice Scalia identified four more
differences between the facts of Davis and the interrogation in
Crawford.23 First, the caller in Davis was describing “events as
they were actually happening” rather than events that had
occurred.24 Second, the 911 caller in Davis faced an ongoing
emergency, while there was no emergency when the statement
was made in Crawford. Third, the questions and answers in
Davis were necessary to resolve the emergency, while in
Crawford they involved past events. Fourth, the statements in
Davis were frantic and made in a setting that apparently was not
safe instead of in an interview room in a police station as in
Crawford.25
Together the circumstances of Davis established that the
primary purpose at the beginning of the 911 call was “to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”26 That meant
that the statements of the 911 caller were not testimonial, at
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 458.
See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2276-77.
Id. at 2277.

KIRST

6/22/2007 1:11 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

640

least until the emergency ended, “when Davis drove away from
the premises.”27 The statements that were made after Davis left
“could readily be maintained” to have been testimonial, but the
petition for certiorari had not raised any question about the later
portion of the 911 call so the Court did not address it.28 The
Supreme Court’s agreement with the Washington Supreme Court
that the initial statements were not testimonial meant that the
Court affirmed the Washington judgment.
The Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in
Hammon because that interrogation was similar to the
interrogation in Crawford and distinguishable from the 911 call
in Davis. The formalities of the statement in Crawford such as
the Miranda warning, tape-recording, and location in a police
station were not present in Hammon, but Justice Scalia explained
that none was an essential difference.29 The similarities the
Court stressed were that in neither Crawford nor Hammon was
the defendant present during the interview and in both cases the
statements were answers to police questions about past events.
The Court explained that the statement in Hammon was made
when there was no emergency in progress, it was made by a
person who was then protected by the presence of the police
officers, and it described past events.30
The Supreme Court directly addressed the conclusion of the
Indiana court that “responses to initial inquiries by officers
arriving at a scene are typically not testimonial.”31 It rejected
that conclusion if it meant that “virtually any” response would
be nontestimonial. Instead, the Court stated only that “often” a
response would be nontestimonial. The Court stressed that a
nontestimonial statement would involve a declarant making a
statement to officers as “a cry for help” or “the provision of
information enabling officers immediately to end a threatening
situation.”32 Both the fact that the statement was made at an
27
28
29
30
31
32

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006).
Id.
See id. at 2278.
See id.
Id. at 2279.
Id.
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alleged crime scene and that it was made during initial inquiries
were described as immaterial.33
In his separate opinion, Justice Thomas argued that Justice
Scalia had provided a test for identifying a testimonial statement
that would be unpredictable and not workable.34 Justice Scalia’s
direct response was a reminder that he had not tried to provide
an exhaustive test, and an assertion that the Davis test was
workable for “the cases before us and those like them.”35 He
also repeated his earlier statements that the Davis test was
“objective.”36
3. The Tests Defined and Rejected in Davis
Justice Scalia confidently predicted in Davis that
distinguishing testimonial and nontestimonial statements will be
“no great problem” because “trial courts will recognize the
point at which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in
response to interrogations become testimonial.”37 Trial judges
faced with this novel task, lawyers trying to anticipate how a
judge will rule on an objection, and appellate courts reviewing
the results might prefer a little more guidance about what to do
with variations on the facts described in Davis.
It is possible to find practical guidance in Davis that will be
both substantially accurate in typical cases and not overly
complicated. A key element in the Court’s definition of
testimonial and nontestimonial statements is an “emergency.”
The most significant factor that explains why the outcome in
Davis was different from the outcome in Hammon is whether the
speaker was facing an ongoing emergency at the time. As a
result, one important question is, when does an emergency end?
The Court described a nontestimonial statement as one made

33

See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006).
Id. at 2280 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
35
Id. at 2278 n.5.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 2277.
34
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when the speaker was “facing an ongoing emergency.”38 In
discussing why the facts of Davis involved an ongoing
emergency, Justice Scalia described how the 911 caller was
“speaking about events as they were actually happening” and
making “a call for help against a bona fide physical threat.”39
He also explained that the statements were necessary to “resolve
the present emergency” and that the speaker was in an
environment that was not then safe. He repeated that it was an
emergency and that she was seeking emergency assistance. After
the operator had the information to address “the exigency of the
moment” he explained that “the emergency appears to have
ended (when Davis drove away from the premises).”40 The
assailant’s departure from the scene was significant for Sixth
Amendment purposes, because “[i]t could readily be maintained
that, from that point on, [her] statements were testimonial.”41
Justice Scalia described an entirely different scene in
Hammon—Amy made her statement while “[t]here was no
emergency in progress.”42 She made her accusations to one
officer in the living room while another officer remained with
Hammon in the kitchen, keeping Amy and Hammon separated.
Amy’s statement was testimonial because she was protected by
the police who were present. Her statement did not provide
information to end a threatening situation immediately; the
immediate threat and danger had ended when the officers arrived
and separated Amy and Hammon.43
The focus on the immediate danger to the speaker at the time
of the statement was highlighted by Justice Scalia’s comparison
of the facts of Davis with the facts of Hammon. In Davis the
declarant was not protected because she was alone waiting for
the police to arrive; she was possibly in immediate danger until
he left the scene. In Hammon the declarant was protected
because one officer was with her and another was with the
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 2276.
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006).
Id. at 2277.
Id.
Id. at 2278.
See id.
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alleged assailant in another room.
The definition of emergency in Davis did not include the
time the officer was gathering information after the end of the
immediate attack, even if the officer was trying to protect the
victim from similar harm in the future. That exclusion was
deliberate. The State had argued in its brief in Hammon for an
“immediate safety” rule that would include statements made
after the attack when the police were determining if the victim
needed shelter or other assistance.44 The Solicitor General had
argued in an amicus brief that an officer could still be “securing
the scene” while trying to protect the victim from a repeated
flare-up of violence.45
Justice Thomas endorsed this broader view of what
constitutes an emergency when he argued in his separate opinion
that Justice Scalia had ignored the possibility that the violence
could resume if the police departed without taking any steps to
prevent a recurrence.46 Justice Thomas argued that meeting an
emergency could include determining whether the assailant was
still a continuing danger. Under his argument, the definition of a
nontestimonial statement could include a statement made after
the police had the suspect under control, but while Justice
Thomas clearly raised the issue, he wrote only for himself. The
language of Davis limited the category of nontestimonial
statements to those made while the speaker was facing an
ongoing emergency, and described the emergency as ending
when either the suspect had left the scene or the suspect was
under police control.47
The inquiry about when an emergency ends raises related
questions, such as whether the declarant’s specific role in the
emergency matters. The explanation that the Davis facts
involved a nontestimonial statement because it was made while
the speaker was facing an ongoing emergency does not
44

See Brief of Respondent State of Indiana at 9-10, Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
45
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
State of Indiana at 10-11, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
46
See id. at 2284 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
47
Id. at 2277-78.
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necessarily mean that every statement made during an
emergency will be nontestimonial. The rule in Davis may not
apply if the statement was made during an emergency or about
an emergency by a bystander who was not personally at risk or
under a threat of harm. At the same time, the explanation in
Davis does not necessarily mean that every statement by a
bystander is testimonial.
Another related question is whether the kind of emergency
makes a difference. The explanation that the Davis facts
involved an ongoing physical threat, that the environment was
not safe at the time of the 911 call, and that the emergency
ended when the assailant drove away was a description of a
specific kind of emergency. Subsequent statements seeking
medical care might colloquially be considered statements about
an emergency, but they would not be about the kind of
emergency that was described in Davis.
B. The Supreme Court’s Application of Davis
At the end of June 2006, the Supreme Court disposed of
eighteen petitions for certiorari that raised confrontation issues,
each of which the Court had held while Davis and Hammon
were argued and decided. In eight of the cases the Court granted
the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Davis.48 This disposition is known by
48

See Billingslea v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 057998) (reversing and remanding United States v. Billingslea, 144 F. App’x
98 (11th Cir. 2005)); Anderson v. Alaska, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 058785) (reversing and remanding Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2005)); Thomas v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-9233)
(reversing and remanding People v. Thomas, No. A104336, 2005 WL
2093065 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)); Warsame v. Minnesota, 126 S. Ct. 2983
(2006) (No. 05-8778) (reversing and remanding State v. Warsame, 701
N.W.2d 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005)); Wright v. Minnesota, 126 S. Ct. 2979
(2006) (No. 05-7551) (reversing and remanding State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d
802 (Minn. 2005)); Forrest v. North Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (No.
05-6102) (reversing and remanding State v. Forrest, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C.
2005)); Lewis v. North Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-8875)
(reversing and remanding State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 2006));
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the acronym of a “GVR.” In all eight GVR cases, the petition
had been filed by a defendant. The other ten cases in which the
petition was denied included five petitions filed by the
prosecution49 and five petitions filed by a defendant.50 There
were only seventeen defendants in the eighteen petitions because
both the prosecution and the defendant filed petitions in a
Massachusetts case to obtain Supreme Court review of pre-trial
rulings; each petition raised a separate question about a different
statement so each is counted.51 The Court’s denial of certiorari
in one other case in which there was a confrontation issue in the
state appellate opinion is not applicable here because
confrontation was not the question presented in the petition for
certiorari.52
Castellanos v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (No. 05-9171) (reversing
and remanding People v. Castellanos, Nos. B175888, B181286, 2005 WL
1763623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).
49
See Massachusetts v. Foley, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No.05-769)
(denying review of Commonwealth v. Foley, 833 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2005));
Massachusetts v. Gonsalves, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-674) (denying
review of Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005));
Massachusetts v. Rodriguez, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (No. 05-672) (denying
review of Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 833 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. 2005));
Texas v. Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2978 (2006) (No. 05-357) (denying review of Lee
v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App. 2005)); Russeau v. Texas, 126 S. Ct.
2982 (2006) (No. 05-856) (denying review of Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d
871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
50
See Hembertt v. Nebraska, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (No. 05-5981)
(denying review of State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 2005); Massey
v. Evans, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (No. 05-7157) (denying review of Massey
v. Lamarque, No. 04-55712, 2005 WL 1140025 (9th Cir. 2005); Greene v.
Connecticut, 126 S. Ct. 2981 (2006) (No. 05-8187) (denying review of State
v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005)); Gonsalves v. Massachusetts, 126 S.
Ct. 2982 (2006) (No. 05-8485) (denying review of Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005)); Brito v. United States, 126 S. Ct.
2983 (2006) (No. 85-8766) (denying review of United States v. Brito, 427
F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005)).
51
Massachusetts v. Gonsalves, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-674);
Gonsalves v. Massachusetts, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006) (No. 05-8485).
52
See Petition for Certiorari, Quintero v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 2979
(2006) (No. 05-7502) (denying review of State v. Quintero, No. M200302311-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 941004 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)).
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In October 2006 the Supreme Court disposed of two more
similar cases, entering a GVR order “in light of Davis” on both
a petition filed by a defendant53 and a petition filed by a state.54
In each case the petition had been filed before Davis but the case
was not ready for the Court’s discussion at the time Davis was
announced.
It is both difficult and unwise to draw any conclusions about
the Court’s reasons for a single disposition of a petition by
either a GVR or a denial. By their nature, such dispositions are
not based on full briefing and oral argument, and there is no
explanation from the Court.55 The GVR order identified Davis
as the reason for remanding the ten aforementioned cases for
reconsideration, but that does not necessarily mean that each
previous opinion reached an incorrect result on its facts. At the
same time, the denial of certiorari does not necessarily mean
that the result in a case or the court’s reasoning in the previous
opinion was correct. A petition may be denied either because the
facts do not present the issue or because there is some question
about whether the Court would have jurisdiction. However, in
each of these twenty cases the Supreme Court docket shows that
the petition had been distributed to the Justices for discussion
once or twice before being distributed again after Davis was
announced.56 The docket shows that in each case the Court
requested a response to the petition if a response had not been
filed. These twenty cases were also a selected subset of the
confrontation cases filed after the Court granted certiorari in
Davis and Hammon; other petitions that raised unrelated
confrontation issues were denied during the 2005 term.
53

Cross v. Kentucky, 127 S. Ct. 44 (2006) (No. 05-10347) (reversing
and remanding Cross v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001149-MR, 2005
WL 1703573 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005)).
54
Texas v. Mason, 127 S. Ct. 68 (2006) (No. 05-1435) (reversing and
remanding Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App. 2005)).
55
See generally ROBERT L. STERN ET. AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
279-85 (8th ed. 2002). See also Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2006).
56
The Supreme Court docket can be found from the Supreme Court’s
web site at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/docket.html.
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The disposition of the twenty petitions with ten GVR’s and
ten denials shows that the Court sorted the petitions after Davis
was announced. Even though the Court did not explain why it
sorted the petitions as it did, this is a large enough group that it
is worthwhile to consider the facts and dispositions of the cases
to determine if there is any pattern that might provide further
guidance about the Court’s understanding of the rules in Davis.
1. Statements at the Crime Scene to Responding Officers
a. Comparing Hembertt and Lewis
The strongest pattern can be found in the dispositions of the
cases that resembled Hammon. Those were cases that included a
statement at the scene of a crime to a responding police officer.
The Court entered a GVR order in June 2006 in eight of these
cases in which the trial court had admitted a statement that
appeared to be testimonial under the test in Davis—either the
defendant had left the scene before the statement was made or
the defendant was under police control at the time of the
statement.57 The Court denied the petition by a defendant in the
one case in which the trial court admitted a statement at the
scene that appeared to be nontestimonial under the test in
Davis—it was made while the defendant was still at the scene
but was not under police control.58 This pattern can be
illustrated by comparing the Court’s different dispositions of a
case from Nebraska and a case from North Carolina.
The defendant’s petition was denied in Hembertt v.
Nebraska,59 a domestic assault case that began with a 911
dispatcher directing two patrol officers to a residence to check
on the well-being of a resident. At the scene, the officers were
contacted at first by a man who said he had made the 911 call
and then by a woman who was bruised and “crying, hysterical,
57
58
59

See infra notes 65-69, 87-94 and accompanying notes and text.
See infra, notes 59-64 and accompanying notes and text.
126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (No. 05-5981).
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trembling . . .”60 The woman declared that she had been beaten
and threatened with a knife, that this had happened moments
before the officers arrived, and that the assailant was still inside
the house. The officers stopped the woman’s report in order to
locate the alleged assailant in the house. Inside the house they
found Hembertt and arrested him. The officers then interviewed
the complainant. The complainant did not appear as a witness at
trial. The State’s evidence was the testimony of one responding
officer who reported the initial accusation of the complainant.61
The trial court found the initial accusation was an excited
utterance, and overruled the defendant’s hearsay and
confrontation objections.62 The trial court did not allow the
officer to testify about the accusations the alleged victim had
made in the interview after the defendant was in custody.63
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Hembertt’s
conviction after rejecting his confrontation argument. The state
court concluded that the initial accusations were nontestimonial
because they were not the product of structured police
questioning, they were made by a frightened declarant when the
area and suspect were still unsecured, they were not made in
anticipation of eventual prosecution, and they were made to
assist in securing the scene and apprehending the suspect.64
In contrast to the disposition in Hembertt, a GVR order was
entered for the defendant’s petition in Lewis v. North Carolina,65
a case of assault and breaking and entering that also began with
a dispatcher sending an officer to a reported crime scene.66 At
the scene, the officer met a woman who was bruised and “in
shock.”67 The woman reported that she had been assaulted,
described the assault, and provided some identifying information
about the woman who committed the assault. A police detective
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Neb. 2005).
Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 483.
126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-8875).
See State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 2005).
Id. at 833.
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later conducted another interview of the victim at the hospital.
The victim’s death before trial made her unavailable as a
witness.68 Instead, the prosecution called the responding police
officer and the detective to testify about the accusations of the
victim. Both hearsay statements were admitted under the State’s
residual hearsay exception.69
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
without endorsing all of the trial court’s rulings. The appellate
court concluded that the statement to the detective in the hospital
was a product of structured police questioning, but that
admitting this statement was only harmless error.70 The court
also concluded that the initial statement at the crime scene to the
responding officer was not testimonial because there was no
formal interrogation or structured police questioning. Instead,
the responding officer was fulfilling his role “to collect
preliminary information to understand what purportedly took
place, determine if medical attention [was] required, secure the
crime scene, and possibly identify a perpetrator.”71 The North
Carolina court quoted the Nebraska opinion in Hembertt that
described statements made to secure the scene and apprehend the
suspect as not testimonial.72
The different outcomes in Hembertt and Lewis invite a
search for an explanation. Some differences can be set aside.
For example, the state court opinion in Lewis included a lengthy
discourse on forfeiture, but that would not explain the GVR–the
North Carolina court declared that forfeiture was not an issue
because the State had stipulated that the defendant did not cause
the declarant’s death.73 In Lewis, the post-arrest accusation was
admitted at trial and eliminated on appeal as harmless error,
while in Hembertt the post-arrest accusation was excluded at
trial; but Davis did not provide any new rules about assessing
68

Id. at 832.
Id.
70
Id. at 844.
71
Id. at 841.
72
State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 830, 842 (N.C. 2005) (citing State v.
Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005)).
73
Id. at 832 n.1.
69
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whether an error was harmless. The trial court admitted the
initial accusation in Hembertt as an excited utterance, while the
trial court in Lewis invoked the residual hearsay exception, but
Davis and Crawford have emphasized that confrontation analysis
is not tied to hearsay categories.
The different outcomes can be explained using the language
of Davis. In Lewis, the assailant was gone by the time the
officer arrived at the scene. The immediate threat of danger to
the speaker was over. The state court’s explanation in Lewis—
that the victim’s statement was nontestimonial because the
officer was conducting preliminary questioning to understand
and secure the scene, to determine the need for medical
attention, and to identify a perpetrator—described reasons that
did not fit the definition of an emergency adopted in Davis.
Those facts of Lewis were a close match to the facts of
Hammon, and none of the facts resembled the continued danger
the declarant in Davis was facing before the police arrived.
In contrast to Lewis, the assailant in Hembertt had not left
the scene when the responding officers arrived. The complainant
in Hembertt had somewhat more protection from the presence of
the officers than the 911 caller had in Davis, but neither the
complainant nor the officers in Hembertt were in an environment
as secure as the scene in Hammon. The complainant faced an
emergency that had not yet ended. The officers in Hembertt
were informed that the assailant was still nearby, and there was
no way the officers could know whether the assailant was armed
or otherwise dangerous until they found him. In fact, at
Hembertt’s trial the officer testified that he stopped the
complainant’s story until he had located and obtained control
over the suspect.74 The facts of Hembertt appear to present a
good illustration of what Davis described as a nontestimonial
“provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a
threatening situation.”75

74
75

Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d at 477.
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006).
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b. Other Dispositions of Cases Involving Statements at the
Scene
The Massachusetts Attorney General made a concerted effort
to convince the United States Supreme Court to adopt a broader
definition of nontestimonial statements than it eventually did in
Davis. In petitions for certiorari in three different cases,
Massachusetts argued that Crawford should be limited to formal
statements, and that excited utterances in response to an officer’s
preliminary inquiries at a crime scene should be considered
nontestimonial. In each petition, Massachusetts cited Hembertt
for the proposition that only structured police questioning
produces a testimonial statement,76 but the Supreme Court’s
denial of the defendant’s petition in Hembertt was not matched
with a GVR in any of the Massachusetts cases. Instead, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in all three Massachusetts
cases. The difference between Hembertt and the Massachusetts
cases were the facts of each case.
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves77 involved a prosecution for a
domestic assault in which the prosecutor had filed a motion in
limine to allow introduction of a statement the complainant made
to an officer who responded to a report of a disturbance. The
complainant subsequently invoked the Fifth Amendment and
became unavailable as a witness.78 The trial court’s ruling that
the statement to the officer was testimonial and inadmissible
under Crawford was affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in a ruling on the Commonwealth’s pretrial
petition for relief.79 The appellate opinion concluded that the
complainant’s statement to the responding officer was
76

See Petition for Certiorari, Massachusetts v. Foley, 126 S. Ct. 2980
(2006) (No. 05-769), 2005 WL 3438570, at *9; Petition for Certiorari,
Massachusetts v. Gonsalves, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-674), 2005 WL
3197641, at *10; Petition for Certiorari, Massachusetts v. Rodriguez, 126 S.
Ct. 2979 (2006) (No. 05-672), 2005 WL 3197639, at *8.
77
833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005).
78
Id. at 551.
79
Id. at 551-52, 562.
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testimonial because, “as the defendant already had left, there
was no active conflict at the time the officers arrived.”80 For
that reason, the officer’s questioning was interrogation under
Crawford and the statement was testimonial.
On the same day, the Massachusetts court applied its
conclusion in Gonsalves in two similar cases. In Commonwealth
v. Rodriguez,81 four officers responded to a family dispute; two
officers interviewed the defendant outside his home and two
officers spoke to the complainant and other family members
inside. The accusations by the complainant and his sister were
made while the defendant was under police control.82 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the
statements were testimonial; the declarants did not testify at trial
so admitting the statements was a violation of the right of
confrontation.83
In Commonwealth v. Foley84 there were two responding
officers to a domestic dispute. The first officer to enter the
house asked only, “Where is he?” The first officer arrested the
suspect after a child pointed to a bedroom, and turned the
suspect over to the custody of a second officer outside the
home.85 Only after the arrest had taken place did the first officer
talk to the complainant to assess the situation and determine if
medical attention was needed; that was when the complainant
made the accusation used at trial. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that the statement to the first officer
was testimonial because it was made after the scene was
secure.86
The denials of certiorari in the three Massachusetts cases and
in Hembertt were consistent. The denials in the Massachusetts
cases did not disturb the conclusion that a statement to the police
is testimonial if made after the suspect had left the scene or was
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 552.
833 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. 2005).
Id. at 134.
Rodriguez, 833 N.E.2d at 135.
833 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2005).
Id. at 132.
Foley, 833 N.E.2d at 133.
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under police control. The denial in Hembertt did not disturb the
conclusion that a statement to the police is not testimonial if the
victim still faces a threat from the assailant. The denials also
identify what the Supreme Court was defining as the end of the
emergency.
GVR orders were entered for several other defense petitions
in addition to the petition in Lewis. Those GVRs were consistent
with the apparent pattern in Lewis, Hembertt, and the
Massachusetts cases on when the emergency was at an end. For
example, in Thomas v. California,87 the suspect fled the scene of
a domestic assault before the police arrived; the police had the
scene secured when the alleged victim made the accusations. In
Forrest v. North Carolina,88 the police responded to a hostage
situation in which Forrest appeared to be holding his aunt; the
aunt made the challenged statements after the police ended the
hostage situation and arrested the defendant. The facts in two
other GVR cases involved statements of witnesses after the
defendant fled the scene. In Castellanos v. California,89 the
defendant had jumped out of the stolen car he was driving and
was trying to escape from a pursuing deputy when a passenger
in his car made the particular statement to another deputy. In
Billingslea v. United States,90 the witness described someone
who had come into his store shortly after a robbery at a nearby
bank; by that time the suspect had apparently fled the area and
could not be located by several responding police officers.
The facts in two other cases in which a GVR order was
entered based on a defendant’s petition are not as clear, but it
appears that neither involved a statement by a declarant who was
still facing an emergency. In each case, nothing in the state
87

126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-9233) (reversing and remanding
People v. Thomas, No. A104336, 2005 WL 2093065 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).
88
126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (No. 05-6102) (reversing and remanding State
v. Forrest, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005)).
89
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (No. 05-9171) (reversing and remanding
People v. Castellanos, Nos. B175888, B181286, 2005 WL 1763623 (Cal.Ct.
App. 2005)).
90
126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-7998) (reversing and remanding
United States v. Billingslea, 144 F. App’x 98 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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court opinion or the filings in the Supreme Court suggests that
the responding officers were concerned about the safety of the
scene or locating the defendant at the time the challenged
statement was made. For example, in Warsame v. Minnesota91
the state court concluded that the entire statement of an alleged
victim of domestic abuse was nontestimonial even though the
responding officer met the victim on the street two or three
houses from the scene of an alleged domestic assault. The
opinion did not specify when in the conversation the officer
learned that the defendant had left in a car, but it also did not
describe any reason the victim might have been facing an
immediate threat at the time of the statement. And in Anderson
v. Alaska,92 the victim of the assault fled the scene, met the
responding officers at a nearby motel, and returned with them so
that the officers could check on a second victim. The state court
opinion did not state whether the suspect was still at the scene,
but it did not suggest that the officers were concerned about the
presence of the suspect at the scene.
The eighth case in which a GVR order was issued was
Wright v. Minnesota.93 Wright also involved a domestic assault
and statements made by a complainant and her sister to the
responding officers after the defendant was in custody. Fitting
this disposition in the pattern is a bit more complicated than the
other seven GVRs, because the prosecution had introduced a
tape and transcript of a 911 call that was made after the
defendant had left the scene, but before he had been
apprehended. As in Davis, the 911 callers in Wright expressed
fears that the defendant might return and cause further harm.94
However, while the 911 call appears to be admissible under
Davis, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not decided if the 911
call alone was sufficient and had not decided if admitting the
91

126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-8778) (reversing and remanding State
v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005)).
92
126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-8785) (reversing and remanding
Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)).
93
126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (No. 05-7551) (reversing and remanding State
v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Minn. 2005)).
94
Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 804.
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later statements to the responding officers was harmless error.
The issue that most probably led to the GVR in Wright was the
State’s use of the testimonial statements to the responding
officers, and not the admission of the 911 call.
The dispositions after Davis of the cases in which a
statement was made at the scene of the crime did not expand on
the Davis answers to the related questions about the required
role of the declarant in the emergency. Where the facts showed
there was an ongoing emergency that created an immediate
threat to the declarant, the Supreme Court did not vacate the
appellate opinion that found a nontestimonial statement. The
GVR dispositions in the cases in which a statement was made at
the scene of the crime involved statements that were made when
the immediate threat of violence or injury was over for the
declarant, as well as for others at the scene. Both the GVRs and
the denials of certiorari in the cases involving statements at the
scene of the crime are consistent with the facts in Davis of an
emergency that involved a threat of harm to the declarant. In
some GVR cases and denials of certiorari, the injured victim
needed medical treatment, but the pattern of the dispositions
does not suggest that the Court considered the need for postassault medical treatment to create an emergency when it sorted
the petitions for disposition after Davis.
c. October 2006 Dispositions
The Supreme Court disposed of two additional petitions with
GVRs in light of Davis at the beginning of the 2006 term, three
days after the conference on confrontation at the Brooklyn Law
School at which this Article was first presented. One petition
was filed by the defendant and one by the State; both cases
involved statements at the scene of the crime. These dispositions
were consistent with the pattern in the cases the Court had
sorted in June 2006 immediately after Davis.
In Cross v. Kentucky,95 the appellate court had allowed the
95

127 S. Ct. 44 (2006) (No. 05-10347) (reversing and remanding, Cross
v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001149-MR, 2005 WL 1703573 (Ky.
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prosecution to use a statement by the victim of an assault to a
responding police officer; the victim had earlier told the 911
dispatcher that the perpetrator had left the scene in a cab.96 The
GVR is consistent with the explanation in Davis that a statement
is testimonial if it is made after the departure of the suspect
brings the emergency to an end, and removes the immediate
threat of injury to the caller.
In Texas v. Mason,97 the appellate court had reversed a
conviction on confrontation grounds because the prosecution in a
domestic violence case had introduced the statement of the
complainant to the responding police officer, even though the
complainant did not testify at trial.98 Many of the facts in Mason
were similar to the facts in Hammon, with one important
difference: the reported opinion describes the responding officer
as speaking to the complainant before speaking to Mason, but it
does not describe where Mason was located. The brief filed by
Mason in the Supreme Court described the officer as first
talking to the complainant when she answered the door, and then
talking to Mason in the bedroom where he was sitting on the
bed and appearing to have been asleep.99 This description of the
facts makes Mason analogous to Hembertt and unlike Hammon
on the issue of whether the police had control of the scene at the
time of the statement. The accusation was made when the
complainant was still at risk of attack, so it was not testimonial
under the Davis definition. It appears that the Texas opinion was
granted a GVR order because the state court had applied the
Confrontation Clause to exclude a victim’s accusation at the
scene that was admissible under Davis.

App., 2006)).
96
See Cross v. Commonwealth, 2005 WL 1703573, at **1, 5.
97
127 S. Ct. 68 (2006) (No. 05-1435) (reversing and remanding, Mason
v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App. 2005)).
98
Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d at 111-12.
99
Brief of Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 2, Texas v. Mason, 127 S. Ct. 68 (2006) (No. 05-1435).
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2. 911 Calls
There were two cases the Supreme Court sorted for
disposition after Davis involving only a 911 call. In both cases,
the Court denied the defendant’s petition for certiorari. The
pattern in these cases is consistent with the pattern in the cases
involving a statement at the scene. In addition, these cases
highlight the importance of the related question about the
required role of the declarant.
The case that most clearly matched the facts of Davis was
United States v. Brito.100 In Brito, there were two calls made to
911, one from a man in an office who heard gunshots in a
saloon parking lot and one about the same incident from a
woman in a passing car.101 The man who made the first 911 call
was not apparently at any risk from the shooter, but that man
testified at trial; there was no confrontation issue about that call.
The second 911 call came from an anonymous woman who did
not testify at trial. The tape of that 911 call included statements
that supported the government’s case as well as this comment:
But I was just saying to my son when I was getting in
the car that I didn’t come to Brockton to die. And
when I was pulling out and backing out driving down
the street, he pointed a gun at me and acted like he
was shooting at my car.102
The caller then continued by describing where the shooter
was standing and what his gun looked like.103
Brito was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon and by an illegal alien, so there was no victim as
in Davis or in the other domestic violence cases. Nevertheless,
the 911 call supports an objective finding that the 911 caller
appeared to be facing an immediate threat from an armed man at
the time she made the statements about what was then
100

United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
Brito v. United States. 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006).
101
Id. at 56.
102
Id.
103
Id.
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happening. The First Circuit held that the second 911 call did
not create a confrontation violation.104 The Supreme Court’s
denial of certiorari in Brito is consistent with the Davis
description of a nontestimonial statement as one made while the
declarant was facing an immediately threatening emergency.
In the second case involving only a 911 call, Massey v.
Lamarque,105 the declarant in the 911 call was not facing the
kind of immediate emergency as in Davis. Massey involved a
murder prosecution for a shooting outside of an apartment
building. The prosecution’s evidence included statements by an
11-year-old girl who went to an apartment after the shooting and
talked to the 911 operator who had called back because an
earlier call had been hung-up.106 Other evidence showed that the
shooter had immediately fled the scene.107 The appellate record
before the Supreme Court noted that a police officer had
testified that he and his partner heard the shooting, looked over
a wall and saw the victim on the ground, and immediately drove
to the scene.108 Nothing in the 911 conversation indicated that
the 11-year-old had been threatened or feared for her own
safety, but no one foresaw the need to present evidence on the
issue raised by Davis.
Other facts in Massey make it more difficult to know how to
classify the denial of certiorari. Massey was not a direct appeal
from the state court conviction. The conviction in Massey had
been affirmed by a California District Court of Appeal in an
opinion that rejected a hearsay objection to the 911 call, but did
not mention confrontation or any federal constitutional issue.109
104

Id. at 62-63.
Massey v. Lamarque, No. 04-55712, 2005 WL 1140025 (9th Cir.
May 9, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006).
106
See People v. Massey, No. B148256, 2002 WL 16086, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2002).
107
Id.
108
Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge,
Massey v. Lamarque, No. CV 03-1703-AHM (PLA) at 3 (C.D. Cal., Dec.
24, 2003) (Appendix B to Petition for Certiorari, Massey v. Lamarque., 126
S. Ct. 2979 (2006)).
109
See id.
105
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This petition was filed after Massey lost his statutory habeas
action in federal court. In a memorandum written before
Crawford, the United States Magistrate Judge recommended
rejecting the confrontation claim because the 911 tape was a
spontaneous statement that was admissible under a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, and that therefore it had adequate indicia of
reliability.110 The Ninth Circuit, in an unsigned and unpublished
memorandum opinion, found that the 911 tape was not
testimonial, with a citation to an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion
which stated that 911 calls were not the evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed.111
The facts of Massey appear closer to the facts of Hammon
than Davis, and the Ninth Circuit’s explanation is not supported
by Davis. This might suggest that the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion
in Massey should be reconsidered after Davis, but Massey’s
handwritten pro se petition was denied instead of being granted a
GVR order. There are two possible explanations for this result.
One is that in sorting the cases after Davis, the Court saw no
difference between a 911 call from someone facing an
immediate threat and a 911 call from a frightened child who was
not facing a threat herself. The other explanation is that the
confrontation issue was not sufficiently preserved and presented.
The confrontation issue had not been raised in state court and
the federal courts had avoided deciding whether it was properly
preserved. In addition, other witnesses to the shooting did
testify. The state appellate opinion did not have any reason to
discuss whether any constitutional error was harmless, but it had
suggested that any error in the hearsay ruling was harmless.112
The second explanation appears to be the more likely reason for
the Court’s denial, which means that the disposition of Massey
should not be considered as suggesting that a 911 call can be
nontestimonial under Davis if the 911 caller is not facing any
danger.
110

Id. at 10 (Appendix B to Petition for Certiorari, Massey v.
Lamarque., 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006)).
111
See Massey v. Lamarque, 2005 WL 1140025, at *1 (citing Leavitt v.
Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n. 22 (9th Cir. 2004).
112
See People v. Massey, 2002 WL 16086, at *3.
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The few cases involving 911 calls may not answer every
question, but they are a reminder that Davis did not endorse the
routine admission of all 911 calls. In fact, the Court did deny a
defendant’s Petition in one other post-Davis case that involved a
911 call.113 This case has not been included in this analysis
because the state court’s finding that the confrontation issue had
not been preserved makes it doubtful that the denial of certiorari
was based on the facts. If the Court did consider the facts, the
denial would be fully consistent with Davis. The declarant was
facing an immediate emergency because the 911 call apparently
was made during a domestic dispute as the defendant was trying
to force his way into the caller’s home.114
3. Other Kinds of Statements
After Davis the Court denied the petitions for certiorari in
three cases that involved facts unlike those in Davis. In Texas v.
Russeau,115 the State argued that it should be able to use Prison
Discipline Records as business records without providing the
defendant with an opportunity to confront the declarants. In
Texas v. Lee,116 the State asked the Court to allow the
prosecution to use the statement of an accomplice during a
custodial interrogation because it was the product of informal
questioning. In Gonsalves v. Massachusetts,117 the defendant
challenged a state court conclusion that a victim’s hearsay
statement to her mother was not testimonial. Each case is a
reminder that there are still many unresolved issues after
113

Marino v. New York, 126 S. Ct. 2930 (2006) (No. 05-8925)
(denying review of People v. Marino, 800 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005)).
114
Brief of Respondent New York to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Marino v. New York, 126 S. Ct. 2930 (2006) (No. 05-8925).
115
126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006) (No. 05-856) (denying review of Russeau v.
State, 171 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
116
126 S. Ct. 2978 (2006) (No. 05-357) (denying review of Lee v.
State, 143 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App. 2005)).
117
126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006) (No. 05-8485) (denying review of
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005)).
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Crawford and Davis, but there is no pattern that might provide
further information about interpreting Davis.
The last disposition to be discussed is an example of the
importance of considering the facts of a case before accepting
the language of an opinion as an authoritative holding. The facts
of Greene v. Connecticut118 involved a gang shooting in which
Greene sprayed a crowd with 70 bullets from an assault weapon
before he fled the scene.119 He was eventually convicted of
manslaughter, two conspiracies, five counts of first degree
assault, and possession of an assault weapon; he also plead
guilty to three counts of theft of a firearm.120 One of the persons
assaulted was Harris, a bystander who later spoke to an officer
at the scene. After a lengthy discussion of confrontation
doctrine, the state court concluded that Harris’ statement was
nontestimonial hearsay.121 The only issue in Greene’s petition
was the state court’s interpretation of confrontation doctrine,
with a request to hold the case until Davis and Hammon were
decided.
However, the closest the state court opinion in Greene came
to describing a hearsay statement by Harris was this answer
from the officer after the prosecutor asked who had approached
him at the scene of the shooting: “A black man, I believe his
name was Mr. [Harris] who stated - he came up to me and said
he was shot in the foot, in the right foot, and there was a hole in
his boot and he was grazed.”122 After testifying about that
statement, the officer testified that he had the fire department
examine Harris, and that Harris declined an ambulance because
he could go to the hospital on his own.123 Another officer
testified there was a report on the police radio of a sixth victim,
and hospital records confirmed that Harris did have a bullet in

118

126 S. Ct. 2981 (2006) (No. 05-8187) (denying review of State v.
Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005)).
119
See Greene, 874 A.2d at 757.
120
See id. at 755-56.
121
Id. at 771-76.
122
See id. at 772.
123
Id.
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his foot.124 The defendant did not object to this evidence, and
did not cross-examine either officer about Harris.125
The first question in Greene should have been whether there
was an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. The officer’s
observation provided direct evidence that Harris had been shot.
Harris did not say Greene shot him, or even when or where he
had been shot. The statement by Harris explained why the
officer looked at Harris’ foot and had the fire department look at
his foot, but that nonhearsay use of the statement does not raise
a confrontation issue. As a result, the petition by Greene
involved a state court opinion that apparently reached the right
result even if for the wrong reason, an issue that affected only a
minor part of the charges in the case, and facts that did not
present a confrontation issue. The defendant asserted another
confrontation violation in the admission of Harris’ statements at
the hospital, but the state court opinion did not discuss that issue
and neither the state court opinion nor the petition for certiorari
mentions any objection to that evidence. For all these reasons,
the denial of certiorari in Greene provides no guidance for
interpreting Davis.
C. Restating Davis as Rules
Justice Blackmun provided valuable advice in Ohio v.
Roberts when he suggested that any confrontation rule should
consider “the need for certainty in the workaday world of
conducting criminal trials.”126 Every condition, exception, and
modification that might make a rule a bit more accurate may at
the same time make it too complex to be applied consistently.
Trying to state every condition in a single rule may produce a
rule that is awkward or inaccurate in practice. Since the end of
an ongoing emergency is the most dominant factor in the
Court’s confrontation analysis of a victim’s statement at the
scene of domestic violence, the effect of Davis and the post124
125
126

Id.
See State v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750, 772 (Conn. 2005).
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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Davis dispositions on the admissibility of the complainant’s
accusation at the scene of a crime of violence can be restated in
this way:
A complainant’s accusation about domestic or other
violence that has just occurred is TESTIMONIAL if
made to responding police officers after the suspect
has left the scene or after the suspect is under police
control. Such an accusation to the responding police
officers is NONTESTIMONIAL if made while the
complainant is still facing an immediate threat of
further violence or injury.
The emphasis in Davis on the vulnerability of that specific
911 caller and the apparent pattern in the post-Davis dispositions
suggest that the admissibility of a 911 call reporting a crime of
violence can be restated in this way:
A complainant’s accusation about domestic or other
violence in a 911 call is NONTESTIMONIAL if it
reports a crime that is ongoing at the time of the call,
or if it reports a crime that has just occurred and the
caller still appears to be at immediate risk of further
assault. Such an accusation in a 911 call is
TESTIMONIAL if the violence has ended and the
caller is not at immediate risk of further assault
before the police respond.
These rules provide guidance that is both accurate and
workable in a trial court for typical cases of domestic violence
and similar crimes of violence. They may not provide guidance
for statements in other kinds of cases or even for domestic
violence cases with atypical facts, but the Supreme Court has
not determined how the Confrontation Clause applies in every
case. The language of Davis will undoubtedly be quoted as other
courts try to decide whether other kinds of statements are
testimonial or nontestimonial. The post-Davis dispositions
provide no further assistance in determining whether such
extrapolation beyond the facts of Davis will produce accurate
rules.
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D. Initial History of the Post-Davis GVRs
The Eleventh Circuit wrote the first opinion on remand in
the GVR cases in a per curiam decision that reversed the
conviction in United States v. Billingslea and remanded the case
to the district court for a new trial.127 The opinion explained that
the particular statement was testimonial under the test in Davis
because there was no ongoing emergency at the time, and the
only purpose of the interrogation was to obtain evidence of an
earlier crime.128 The court held that admitting the statement was
a confrontation violation because the defendant could not
confront the unavailable declarant at trial and the defendant did
not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at
the time of interrogation.129
In contrast to the action of the Eleventh Circuit in
Billingslea, the California appellate court that reexamined its
analysis in People v. Castellanos after the GVR continued to
adhere to its earlier conclusion that there was no confrontation
violation. The court found that the facts before it were closer to
the facts of Davis than to the facts of Hammon.130 The statement
in dispute was an accusation by a passenger in the car in which
Castellanos had been trying to escape from pursuing officers.
After Castellanos jumped out of the still-moving car and tried to
run away, an officer went to the car to check on the other
occupants.131 After the passenger was handcuffed, the passenger
volunteered her perspective on the incident with several
statements.132 One statement was an accusation that Castellanos
had tried to hit an officer with the car when he drove away from
an earlier traffic stop.133
The California appellate court did not discuss whether the
127

No. 03-12483, 2006 WL 3201100 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2006).
See id. at *2.
129
See id.
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Nos. B175888, B181286, 2006 WL 3072370, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 31, 2006).
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emergency that created a threat of harm to the passenger ended
when Castellanos abandoned the car and tried to flee on foot.
Instead, the court declared that the important fact was the lack
of interrogation by the police before the passenger made the
accusation.134 That particular interpretation appears to have been
rejected by footnote 1 of Davis, in which Justice Scalia stated
that the lack of interrogation was not sufficient to define a
statement as nontestimonial.135 The Davis footnote equated
volunteered answers and responses to open-ended questions as
equally objectionable as actual interrogation if the declarant is
never subject to cross-examination. The California appellate
court made no effort to explain how its view about interrogation
was supported by or consistent with Davis. As a result, the
California appellate opinion on remand from the GVR has the
appearance of a rather weak effort to avoid recognizing that the
end of the emergency meant the accusation was a testimonial
statement under the definition in Davis.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. Warsame also
adhered to its earlier holding that the prosecution could use an
accusation by a victim that the defendant had threatened to kill
her to prove a felony charge of Terroristic Threats.136 The
statement was made to an officer at the scene by the victim after
the defendant had left with the victim’s sister.137 After the
prosecution could not locate the victim, the trial court ruled that
Crawford made the victim’s statement inadmissible.138 That
pretrial ruling was reversed on an appeal by the prosecution.139
The appellate court held that an initial police-victim interaction
at the scene does not involve interrogation, and that a resulting
statement is not testimonial. On remand from the GVR, the
appellate court accepted the State’s concession that the victim
was no longer facing an ongoing emergency at the time she
made some of her accusation, but it still concluded that her
134
135
136
137
138
139

See id.
See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.1 (2006).
State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637, 642-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 639
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entire accusation was not a testimonial statement.140
The Minnesota court reinterpreted the facts in Warsame as
involving not one but three separate emergencies—the threat to
the victim who made the accusation, the threat to the sister who
had left the scene in the defendant’s car, and the threat to a
second sister who was in the residence with a small cut to her
hand.141 The threats to the sisters had barely been mentioned in
the same court’s prior opinion.142 The court declared that the
declarant did not have to be facing her own emergency at the
time of the statement.143 All that was required was that there be
an emergency—at another location and involving some other
person–as long as that other emergency was related to the
declarant’s situation so that questioning the declarant might
clarify the other emergency.144 The court also did not require
that the defendant be creating a threat at the time—the possible
need for medical attention to the sister’s cut finger was enough
for the emergency to continue.145 The Minnesota court made no
effort to support this interpretation of Davis with any language
from that opinion, leaving Warsame as another example of an
appellate court’s effort to avoid applying the holding of Davis.
Later opinions on remand in other GVR cases recognized
that a statement to the police after the emergency ends is
testimonial under the test in Davis. In People v. Thomas, a
California court concluded that a statement was testimonial
because it was made to the police after the defendant had left the
scene.146 In State v. Wright, the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that a statement was testimonial because it was made
to the police after the defendant was in custody.147 However, the
Minnesota court also concluded that the dividing line between a
testimonial and nontestimonial statement did not have to be the
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Warsame, 723 N.W.2d at 641.
Id.at 641-42.
Warsame, 701 N.W.2d at 307.
Warsame, 723 N.W.2d at 641.
Id. at 641-42.
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2006 WL 3775882, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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exact moment the suspect was taken into police custody.148 In
Wright the court allowed the prosecution to use statements made
by a 911 caller as the 911 operator was trying to reassure the
caller that the emergency had ended, that the suspect really was
in police custody, and that the caller could hang up.149 The 911
operator was not interrogating the victim after the emergency
was over, a fact that distinguished this case from the 911
operator’s continued questioning that Davis suggested might
have produced a testimonial statement.150
Each appellate opinion on remand in Thomas and Wright also
directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine if the
defendant had forfeited his confrontation right by coercing the
declarant from testifying. The Minnesota court in Wright
concluded that the prosecution could introduce new evidence at
the hearing, and rejected the defendant’s objection that
expanding the record after conviction violated due process.151
The California court in Thomas also stated that the prosecution
could present evidence of coercion at an evidentiary hearing,
without discussing whether the defendant could object to new
evidence offered by the prosecution at such a hearing.152 On this
issue there was no guidance in Davis, which left the forfeiture
issue in Hammon for decision on remand without stating whether
forfeiture had to be shown by evidence already in the record.153
The Indiana Supreme Court did not discuss the possibility of a
separate hearing on forfeiture, because it remanded the case to
the trial court for a new trial.154
A marked contrast to the opinions that interpret, apply, or
extend Davis to the specific facts of the case can be found in the
opinion on remand in Cross v. Commonwealth.155 This opinion
from a Kentucky appellate court first presented nineteen
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
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See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006).
State v. Wright, 726 N.W.2d 464, 480-82. (Minn. 2007).
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paragraphs reciting the facts and an extended quotation of ten
paragraphs from Davis. The opinion then concluded in a single
short paragraph that a 911 call is nontestimonial if the caller is
seeking emergency assistance; that meant there was no
confrontation violation in admitting the statement of a 911 caller
who reported that the assailant had left the scene in a taxicab.156
The Kentucky court neither quoted the paragraph in Davis that
described the emergency as ending when the assailant left the
premises,157 nor discussed its apparent failure to apply the
definition of an emergency set out in Davis.
E. Applications of Davis by Other Courts
The initial group of post-Davis cases has provided a variety
of explanations for deciding whether there was an ongoing
emergency at the time a victim or witness made a statement to
the police. On their facts, many of these cases reach results that
are consistent with the rule that a statement by a victim after the
suspect has left the scene or after the police have control of the
suspect is testimonial and therefore not admissible without
confrontation at trial. Other opinions show resistance to the
Court’s definition of the end of an emergency.
1. Statements to Officers at the Crime Scene
After Davis, several opinions discussed whether a statement
at the scene to a responding officer was testimonial. For
example, the Supreme Court of West Virginia concluded that the
victim of a domestic dispute made a testimonial statement to
responding officers because “[t]here was no emergency in
progress when the deputies arrived, and the defendant had
clearly departed the scene when the interrogation occurred.”158
In a habeas case, a federal district court concluded that a child
who had witnessed a domestic assault made a testimonial
156
157
158

Id. at *6.
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statement because she spoke to a responding officer “when there
was no emergency in progress. [The victim] was being treated
for her injuries by paramedics and Petitioner had been arrested
and taken out of the house.”159 A Kansas appellate court reached
a consistent conclusion without discussion in ruling that a child’s
statements about sexual abuse that were made to an officer well
after the incidents had occurred were testimonial.160 The Oregon
Court of Appeals reversed a conviction in a domestic abuse case
because the prosecution rested on an accusation at the scene by
the victim who did not testify; the statement had been made after
the “defendant was gone. The emergency had dissipated, and the
girlfriend was under no threat of immediate harm.”161 Several
other courts have concluded that a statement is testimonial if it is
made after the emergency has ended.162
Other appellate courts have recognized the importance of
identifying the end of the emergency, finding that a statement
was not testimonial in cases in which the responding officers did
not have control of the suspect. For instance, in Vinson v.
State,163 a case whose facts resembled those of Hembertt,164 the
Nebraska case in which the Petition for Certiorari was denied,
the complainant met the responding officer and made the first
accusations before the defendant entered the room. The court
concluded that this accusation and subsequent accusations the
complainant made after the officer saw the defendant were
nontestimonial because they were all made at a time when the
officer did not feel the scene was safe, and was still assessing
159

Cook v. McGrath, No. C 03-2719 JSW (PR), 2006 WL 2479111, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2006).
160
State v. Noah, No. 91,353, 2006 WL 1976505, at **5-6 (Kan. Ct.
App. July 14, 2006).
161
State v. Miles, 145 P.3d 242, 244 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
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See, e.g., State v. Parks, 142 P.3d 720, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006);
State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506, 522-23 (Conn. 2006); Raile v. People, 148
P.3d 126, 132-33 (Colo. 2006); State v. Bird, No. 32943-3-II, 2006 WL
3201050, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2006).
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Nos. 01-05-00784-CR, 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 WL 2291000 (Tex.
App. Aug. 10, 2006).
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whether he needed back-up assistance and whether he needed to
place the defendant in the patrol car.165
Some appellate courts have defined an emergency more
broadly than the Davis facts. In People v. Carpenter,166 the
responding officer was not able to interview the victim until he
found a Spanish interpreter. The statements were made at the
hospital when there was no longer any apparent threat that the
declarant might be injured. The court rested its conclusion that
there was the proper kind of emergency on the officer’s
testimony that there might still be an ongoing emergency at the
crime scene because: “there was an inordinate amount of blood
at the location for there being only one victim . . . I was
worried there may be other family members or small children
that were unaccounted for . . .”167 In Garcia v. State, the
appellate court concluded there was an ongoing emergency even
though the domestic assault had ended and the defendant had left
the scene, because the defendant had taken the parties’ child
when he left and the complainant feared the child might have
been injured when the defendant grabbed him from her.168 In
State v. Alvarez, an Arizona appellate court followed the same
reasoning in finding that a statement to officers by an injured
victim identifying his assailants was not testimonial, even though
the assault had ended and the assailants had fled; the court found
it was sufficient that the victim still faced a medical
emergency.169
The opinion of the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Clemmons illustrates a similar effort to define an emergency
more broadly than a threat of further injury to the declarant.170
165

Vinson v. State, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR, 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 WL
2291000 at **7-9.
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No. E038769, 2006 WL 2278763, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8,
2006).
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Id., at *6.
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This case involved a felon in possession of a firearm conviction
in which the government’s evidence included the statement of an
absent witness to a responding officer that the defendant had
shot the witness. The responding officers had found the victim
lying on the ground with a gunshot wound, talking on his cell
phone in a calm voice.171 Nothing in the opinion suggested that
the shooter was still present at the scene, or that the officers
were concerned that the suspect was present and a threat to their
safety. However, the court concluded that the statement was
nontestimonial under Davis because the officer described his
purpose in interrogating the victim as “[t]o investigate, one, his
health to order him medical attention, and, two, try [] to figure
out who did this to him.” The court then declared, “Any
reasonable observer would understand that [the victim] was
facing an ongoing emergency and that the purpose of the
interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet that
emergency.”172 This sentence describes the “emergency” from a
different perspective than the Supreme Court considered in
Davis.
There were also cases in which the courts found that a
statement at the scene was nontestimonial even though it was
made after the defendant had left the scene or was under police
control. For instance, a Wisconsin appellate court in a domestic
assault case concluded that statements of the victim were
nontestimonial without discussing whether the emergency had
ended before the victim spoke to the responding officer.173
Nothing in the opinion suggested that the officers were
concerned that the suspect was still on the premises; instead the
court focused on whether the declarant would have expected her
excited utterances to be used at trial.174 A few other opinions
presented a similar focus on the excitement of the victim.175 The
171
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common thread in these opinions is the absence of any
discussion of whether the emergency had ended at the time the
statement was made. That silence is a confirmation that there is
no guarantee that the details of a definition adopted by the
Supreme Court and applied by the Supreme Court in sorting the
next twenty cases will be even recognized by other courts.
2. 911 Calls
Some appellate cases in which the challenged statement was
made in a 911 call have followed the distinction between an
ongoing emergency and a report after the emergency has ended.
In two cases the, 911 caller was apparently facing an ongoing
emergency. One court concluded that a statement was
nontestimonial in a case in which the 911 call from a cell phone
reported an intoxicated driver who had just thrown a beer bottle
at the caller.176 Another court reached a similar conclusion about
a 911 caller whose complaint that he had been rammed more
than once by an intoxicated driver “described events as they
were actually happening.”177 In addition, the importance of the
end of the emergency under Davis was recognized by a Texas
court that concluded that a 911 caller made a testimonial
statement where the caller’s report of a domestic assault at her
own house was made ten to fifteen minutes after the assault,
when she and her children were at her mother’s house and there
was little or no threat of imminent danger.178
As for the cases involving statements at the scene, not every
case involving a 911 call used the Davis definition of an
emergency to determine if a statement was testimonial. In State
v. Camarena, the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that an
accusation of domestic assault in a 911 call that was made a
minute after the assault was not testimonial because the facts
were more similar to Davis than to Hammon.179 The opinion did
176

See Cook v. State, 199 S.W.3d 495, 496-98 (Tex. App. 2006).
Jackson v. State, 931 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
178
Santacruz v. State, No. 14-05-00227-CR, 2006 WL 2506382, at *2
(Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2006).
179
See State v. Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 275 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
177

KIRST

6/22/2007 1:11 AM

CONFRONTATION RULES AFTER DAVIS

673

not directly discuss the significance of the 911 caller’s
immediate statement that the assailant “took the car and he
left.”180 Instead, the opinion simply asserted that it was more
likely the caller was seeking protection against renewal of the
assault than just reporting a past crime, a statement without any
apparent support in the transcript of the 911 call quoted in the
opinion. The opinion then declared that the intent of the
declarant did not matter since “the dispositive distinction . . . is
the primary purpose of the interrogation.”181 Moreover, the
opinion did not explain why this proposition negated the fact the
emergency had ended.
In several other opinions the courts did not discuss whether a
nontestimonial statement had to be made by a declarant who was
facing an immediate emergency. For instance, an Ohio court
declared the purpose of a 911 call was to meet an ongoing
emergency without mentioning the location of the defendant at
the time; he clearly was gone when the police arrived.182 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that a 911 call was a nontestimonial
statement where the caller was describing an ongoing gun battle
outside her apartment.183 The court mentioned that the caller did
not identify herself because she was concerned for her own
safety,184 but the facts do not suggest there was an immediate
threat to the 911 caller. An Oregon court similarly did not
discuss any threat to the 911 caller in reviewing a conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm where the 911 call by
the defendant’s mother was a report that he had threatened to
shoot himself.185 An appellate court in California concluded that
a statement in a 911 call by the sister of an assault victim during
the assault was not testimonial without discussing whether the
sister also was being threatened.186 Finally, an appellate court in
180
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Mississippi concluded that a 911 call by the defendant’s wife in
which she reported that she had just seen the defendant
abducting the wife’s friend and driving away was not testimonial
because the wife was trying to initiate an investigation of the
current situation and not recounting a past crime.187
F. An Initial Appraisal
Identifying the pattern in the post-Davis certiorari
dispositions does not necessarily add any explanation beyond the
language of Davis for the Court’s decision to make the existence
of an ongoing emergency such an important factor in the
confrontation analysis of statements by domestic violence
victims. However, it is possible to consider some effects of that
decision.
First, the rules provided by Davis for 911 calls and
statements to responding officers have refined prior
confrontation doctrine. In White v. Illinois,188 the Supreme Court
held that there was no confrontation violation when the
prosecution used an excited utterance of an available declarant.
The Court in White limited the grant of certiorari to the
confrontation question,189 so it did not define an excited
utterance and did not have to decide whether the statements in
the case were actually the proper kind of excited utterances. In
Crawford, the majority opinion by Justice Scalia cast doubt on
White and suggested that an excited utterance had to be made
“immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and before [the
declarant] had time to devise or contrive any thing for her own
advantage.”190 Davis modified both of these prior discussions
without mentioning either White or the Crawford gloss on White.
After Davis, a statement by a declarant who is still under the
stress of a startling event may fit within the excited utterance
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2006).
187
See Williams v. State, No. 2005-KA-01383-COA, 2006 WL
3008133, at *3 (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006).
188
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
189
Id. at 351 & n. 4.
190
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n. 8 (2004).
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hearsay exception, but those facts will not resolve the
confrontation question. The statement will be testimonial, even if
the declarant is still under stress, if the emergency ended when
the suspect fled or the officers had the suspect under control.
Second, the phrasing of Davis appears to minimize the need
to choose in most cases between the intent of the questioner or
the intent of the declarant in identifying a testimonial statement.
Neither should matter in a typical case because the rules depend
on an objective interpretation of the circumstances in which the
statement was made. Justice Scalia illustrated that process by
making assumptions about what a typical person would have
been thinking and intending in the circumstances described in
the record. Perhaps that leaves the door open for a contrary
conclusion, only on substantially different facts. A defendant
might show that the circumstances were atypical because either
the questioner or declarant was explicitly trying to create a
substitute for future testimony instead of trying to resolve the
immediate emergency. The prosecution might show that the
emergency was more extensive than in most similar
circumstances.
In addition, the rule in Davis has provided a substitute for
judicial evaluation of reliability, the perceived defect in Roberts
that Crawford sought to eliminate. However, Davis has raised
several questions of its own. Did Davis make confrontation
doctrine more predictable and consistent? Does Davis support
Justice Scalia’s emphasis that whether a statement is testimonial
depends on facts beyond the control of the prosecution or
police? Some actual cases suggest the complexity of answering
these questions. For example, in the Nebraska prosecution in
Hembertt191 there was still an ongoing emergency because the
two responding officers met the victim first, while in the
Massachusetts prosecution in Rodriguez192 the emergency came
to an end more quickly because two of the four responding
officers contacted the victim and two located the suspect. These
cases demonstrate that the application of Davis may depend on
191
192
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how many officers are dispatched to a complaint or on the
officers’ strategy in responding at the scene.
The rule in Davis can also make the application of
confrontation doctrine depend on the declarant’s choice of
words. A declarant who wants the prosecution of a domestic
batterer to succeed without the testimony of the declarant should
tell the responding officer immediately about the details of the
crime and the identity of the assailant before the officers locate
the assailant. Such a declarant should not immediately tell the
responding officers that the assailant has ended the immediate
emergency by leaving the scene. Conversely, a declarant who
wants to preserve the option to preclude the prosecution of the
batterer by ignoring a summons should ask the responding
officer for protection but not explain the details of the crime or
identify the assailant as the specific cause of any injury until the
officer has the assailant under control. A 911 caller who says
the assailant has left the scene similarly would preserve the
option to block the prosecution by ignoring a subpoena, while a
911 caller who expresses fear that the assault will continue or
resume would permit the prosecution to proceed on the basis of
the nontestimonial statement.
The defendant’s conduct at the scene can sometimes also
affect the confrontation analysis. For instance, the defendant in
the Nebraska prosecution in Hembertt193 could have converted
the victim’s nontestimonial statement into a testimonial statement
that would have been excluded on a confrontation objection by
coming out of the residence immediately, so the responding
officers would know they had control before the victim made an
accusation.
The purpose of considering these factual variations is neither
to suggest that declarants will often try to game the system with
strategic decisions about what to say and how to say it, nor to
suggest that the Court’s holding in Davis can be easily
manipulated by law enforcement training. The purpose is rather
to ask whether the test is likely to regularly lead to outcomes
that are consistent with the policies the rule is intended to
193
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implement. On that basis, the different outcomes from these
factual variations appear quite removed from any original
purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford described the
principal evil as the civil-law mode of criminal procedure that
used ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.194
Davis reemphasized that “it is the trial use of, not the
investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which
offends [the Confrontation Clause].”195 What Davis did not
explain is why its test appears to depend on how statements are
collected.
The factual variations also highlight how much the discussion
of the objective circumstances in which a statement was made
directs attention away from confrontation as a right of the
defendant. Perhaps the Justice who lamented that an earlier
Court used “reasoning [that] abstracts from the right to its
purposes, and then eliminates the right”196 should ask if the rule
in Davis illustrates the danger of abstracting from the right to a
surrogate that eliminates any mention of the person who holds
the right created by the constitutional text.
II. DAVIS AND OVERALL CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE
The Davis opinion discussed overall confrontation doctrine in
the course of applying the Confrontation Clause to the specific
facts of Davis and Hammon. Other courts and attorneys now
must determine whether they can apply the language of Davis
beyond its facts.
The Davis opinion often warns the reader not to expect to
find a global statement of confrontation doctrine. The analysis
begins with an explicit self-limitation that it is addressing the
topic “[w]ithout attempting to produce an exhaustive
classification of all conceivable statements–or even all
conceivable statements in response to police interrogation–as
194
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either testimonial or nontestimonial.”197 This is followed with a
further warning about the scope of the opinion because “it
suffices to decide the present cases to hold”198 with a rule only
for certain kinds of police interrogation. This limitation is
explained with a footnote that the holding refers to interrogations
because those are the facts “in the cases presently before us.”199
Lest someone consider Davis as establishing whether a 911
operator is always a law enforcement officer for confrontation
purposes, another footnote made clear that Davis assumed that
the 911 operator was part of law enforcement: “For purposes of
this opinion (and without deciding the point), we consider their
acts to be acts of the police.”200 Davis said that in both
Crawford and Davis, the holding “makes it unnecessary to
consider whether and when statements to someone other than
law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’”201 On the facts of
Davis, the Court decided only whether the early portion of the
911 call was testimonial because the Petition for Certiorari
“asked [the Court] to classify only [the caller’s] early statements
identifying Davis as her assailant.”202
In a direct response to the argument by Justice Thomas in
his dissenting opinion that the Davis test was unworkable,
Justice Scalia repeated his statement that “our holding is not an
‘exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements . . .’”203
but that it was “rather a resolution of the cases before us and
those like them.”204 He defended his rule as “the rule we adopt
for the narrow situations we address.”205 His concluding
remarks about the possibility that Hammon had forfeited his
right to assert a confrontation objection began with the caution
that “[w]e take no position on the standard necessary to
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
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demonstrate such forfeiture.”206
Justice Scalia’s ten-fold caution about the limited issue
addressed in Davis may not stop other courts and lawyers from
invoking the language in Davis on other confrontation issues.
Small differences between the phrasing in Crawford and Davis
may draw particular attention. For example, in Davis, Justice
Scalia restated the Crawford holding that a custodial statement of
an accomplice who did not appear at trial was inadmissible
without confrontation because it was testimonial.207 In Davis, he
wrote a broader statement when he stated that “[o]nly” a
testimonial statement can “cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. It is the
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other
hearsay that . . . is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”208
Justice Scalia did not mention in Davis that Crawford had not
used the word “only” to limit the scope of the Confrontation
Clause to testimonial statements; Crawford’s phrasing was that
testimonial statements were the “primary object” of the
Confrontation Clause.209 In Davis, Justice Scalia followed a
quotation from Crawford about the “focus” of the Confrontation
Clause on testimonial hearsay with the stronger assertion that
testimonial hearsay was “[a] limitation so clearly reflected in the
text of the constitutional provision [that it] must fairly be said to
mark out not merely its ‘core’ but its perimeter.”210
Justice Scalia bolstered his statement in Davis that
testimonial hearsay was the perimeter of the right of
confrontation with historical evidence not presented in Crawford.
He asserted: “We are not aware of any early American case
invoking the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to
confrontation that did not clearly involve testimony as thus
defined.”211 That might be a useful hypothesis for examining the
206
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historical record, but there are at least two reasons to ask how
much it supports the proposition for which it was offered. First,
the value of evidence that a particular doctrine was not used
depends on whether there were instances where it could have
been used and was deliberately not used. The same result would
follow if there was no occasion to use the doctrine, or if those
who might have used the doctrine were not the ones who knew
about it. Second, it is not a true statement about history. For
example, Chief Justice Marshall sitting as a Circuit Justice
excluded evidence of private conversations that were offered as
co-conspirator statements in the well-known prosecution of
Aaron Burr.212 These questions about the historical argument
suggest caution in expecting Davis to serve as a reliable source
for new issues.
The final discussion in Davis about the standard for
determining a possible forfeiture of the right of confrontation
provides a strong contrast with the many cautions about the
limited issues addressed in Davis.213 The discussion provides
greater detail than might have been expected for what is labeled
as advisory dictum on an issue that might or might not arise on
remand. The Indiana courts had not relied on forfeiture and the
parties had not briefed the issue. Justice Scalia did not discuss
why the forfeiture doctrine was supported by the historical
evidence he presented in Crawford; he also did not explain how
this nontextual interpretation was consistent with the text of the
Confrontation Clause.
Omissions from Davis also may have an effect on the
development of confrontation doctrine for other facts. Davis did
not mention Idaho v. Wright,214 a prosecution for child sexual
abuse in which Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor’s majority
opinion that found a confrontation violation in the prosecution
use of a child victim’s hearsay statements. Davis was consistent
with Crawford, which also omitted Wright, even though Justice
212

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.C Va. 1807) (No.
14,694). See also Randolph Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions
of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 228-29 (2005).
213
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80.
214
497 U.S. 805 (1990).

KIRST

6/22/2007 1:11 AM

CONFRONTATION RULES AFTER DAVIS

681

Scalia’s majority opinion in Crawford cataloged the Court’s
other confrontation opinions.
III. LOOKING AHEAD
A Petition for Certiorari that became a new hold on the
Court’s docket also provides an apt illustration of the Supreme
Court’s search for stable confrontation doctrine. The facts of this
case began with a 1982 death that led to the murder conviction
of Ralph Earnest on the basis of a custodial confession of his
alleged confederate.215 On appellate review, the New Mexico
Supreme Court reversed that conviction on the basis of Douglas
v. Alabama,216 because the defendant never had an opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.217 The State’s 1985 Petition for
Certiorari resulted in an order for GVR by the Court for
reconsideration in light of Lee v. Illinois, the case in which
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion discussed the interlocking
confession theory.218 This was an atypical GVR, because Justice
Rehnquist added a concurring opinion joined by three other
Justices.219 In his concurrence, he suggested that Douglas had
been supplanted in part by Ohio v. Roberts220 and that after Lee,
the proper test was not cross-examination, but rather,
reliability.221 The Earnest opinion was the high-water mark for
the reliability theory in the Supreme Court, attracting four votes
but not a majority.222 It was also the last confrontation opinion
before Justice Scalia joined the Court.
On remand, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the
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conviction.223 This time the defendant filed what was the second
Petition for Certiorari in the case; it was denied.224 The denial
of Earnest’s habeas corpus petition in federal court was
eventually affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 1996.225 The
defendant then filed the third Petition for Certiorari in his case;
it also was denied.226
After Crawford, Earnest filed a new petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in state court.227 The New Mexico District Court
concluded that Crawford was retroactive and granted the
petition.228 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the order
that the State release Earnest or elect to retry him.229 The court
described the situation and its conclusion:
It is beyond dispute that since Crawford, the rest of
the nation knows now what the New Mexico Supreme
Court announced in 1985: under the Sixth
Amendment, statements from an alleged accomplice
to an officer are inadmissible unless the declarant is
unavailable and the defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.
***
Our decision is limited to the very special facts of
this case, highlighted by the fact that the very law
this Court applied to Earnest’s case twenty years ago
has now been vindicated, which entitles him to the
same new trial he should have received back then.230
The State of New Mexico then filed the fourth Petition for
Certiorari in this case.231 That petition was distributed for the
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Court’s Conference of May 11, 2006, as was the petition in
Whorton v. Bockting raising the same retroactivity issue; only
the Petition in Whorton was granted.232 The Court took no
action on the petition of New Mexico for several months while
Whorton was being decided. During the time the New Mexico
petition was on hold in the United States Supreme Court, the
State of New Mexico tried to obtain an untainted conviction of
Earnest by calling the hearsay declarant as a witness at the new
trial.233 When the declarant refused to testify, the State released
Earnest from prison.234 After the Court held in Whorton235 that
Crawford is not retroactive, it denied the New Mexico
petition.236 That ended the prosecution of Earnest.237 This
resolution may be further evidence that the 1987 opinion in
Earnest in particular was a step in the wrong direction, but there
is still more work to be done as the courts undertake the
complex task of reevaluating all the confrontation doctrine
developed in recent decades.
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